Chapter III

CHAPTER III

PROTESTANTISM AND THE MODERN WORLD:

POINTS OF CONTRAST

But if this is the position of matters, it is evident that the significance of Protestantism which is now in question is far from being of a quite simple nature. There is no direct road leading from Protestant Church-civilisation to the modern civilisation independent of the Church. Its significance, while in general beyond question, must in many cases be an indirect, or even an involuntary one, and the common element which, for all that, unites the two must lie very far down in the hidden depths below the surface of its conscious thought. There can, of course, be no question of modern civilisation's having been produced

simply and solely by Protestantism. All. that comes into question is the latter's share therein. But even this share is nothing simple and homogeneous. It differs in different departments of civilisation, and in them all is something more or less complex and elusive. That is precisely what constitutes the peculiar fascination of the problem, and in order to make this intelligible the opposition between Protestantism and modern civilisation must first be indicated more exactly.

The point of primary importance is that, historically and theologically regarded, Protestantism---especially at the outset in Luther's reform of the Church---was, in the first place, simply a modification of Catholicism, in which the Catholic formulation of the problems was retained, while a different answer was given to them. It was only gradually that out of, this new answer developed consequences of radical importance for the history of religion, and only when the breach with the first form of ]Protestantism occurred did it

appear how far these consequences went beyond a mere new answer to old problems. That, however, only comes into question later. Protestantism was at first concerned only with the answer to the old question about assurance of salvation, which has as its pre-

suppositions the existence of God, and His personal and ethical being, and in general the whole Biblical and medieval cosmology, and has as its only and pressing problem, how, in the face of the condemnation of all men to Hell in consequence of original sin, and in view of the weakness and nothingness of all human and creaturely strength, deliverance from the Judgment, eternal blessedness, and on earth a peace of heart corresponding thereto, secure in its hopes, can be obtained. This is, through and through, the old question which the teaching and discipline of Catholicism had impressed more and more deeply upon men's hearts. Protestantism, instead of pointing to the hierarchic redemptive Organisation of the Church and its priesthood, and to the opus operatum of the sacraments, supported by the will, answers the question by pointing to a simple radical and personal decision to believe, which, if it be really made in earnest, can assure itself, once for all, from the supernatural Divine revelation of the

Bible, of the forgiveness of sins in Christ, and which, on the basis of this certainty, produces all the ethical consequences of reconciliation with God and spiritual union with God. The decisive act of faith receives deliverance purely as an objective assurance of salvation, through the Bible, thus excluding all human effort and making salvation independent of man and dependent on God alone. And the dependence of salvation solely upon God makes it ipso facto absolutely certain, and removes it from the uncertainties and limitations of human action. But since even in this decision to believe there seems to be some kind ,of human action or contributory condition, this decision is itself referred to an immediate Divine action. In the interest of assurance of salvation the doctrine of Predestination becomes the, central doctrine of Protestantism---whether with Luther, Zwingli, or Calvin, equally original and equally necessary. Calvinism, however, more and more made this doctrine the focus of its system, and in its great historical

conflicts drew thence the strong support of the consciousness of election; sacrificing for this, however, rationality and universal love as elements of its conception of God; whereas, Lutheranism, in defending the two latter interests, progressively weakened down the doctrine of predestination, thereby, however, taking from its thought the heroic, the iron element. The consciously elect man feels himself to be the destined lord of the world , who in the power of God and for the honour of God has it laid on him to grasp and shape the world. The man who is simply saved by grace, also, of course, receives his salvation direct from God, but in his dread of acting on the assumptions of predestinarianism avoids any strict delimitation and relation of the spheres of God and the world, and takes refuge rather in a purely religious sphere, out of the world. The latter stands related to the religious sphere in an obscure fashion known only to God, and it is to be borne with and endured rather than dominated.

If the old interest of the certainty of salvation stands in this way in the centre, and if assurance is reached through a more inward and spiritual conception of salvation as well as by a more inward appropriation of it, it follows as a matter of course that the old fundamental idea of wholly authoritative purely Divine ordinances of salvation is retained. Along with the miracle of redemption, delivering sinners from darkness and helpless- ness, there continues also its correlative and continuation, the miracle of the organ of redemption, the Church. Protestantism desired to reform the Church as a whole, and was only forced against its will to set up Churches of its own. These became national Churches simply because Protestantism could only realise its ideal of the Church with the aid of governmental authority, and therefore had to be content not to apply it beyond the national frontiers. It never surrendered the thought of the Church itself as the supernatural organ of salvation, which brings

men redemption and orders their life. It rejects only the jus divinum of the hierarchy and the subordination of the civil to the hierarchic power. The divinely appointed preaching office and sacrament, and the miraculous power of producing conversion which is inherent in the word, are now the backbone of the institution, which is left by Luther to be freely organised, while for Calvin it is adapted by Divine appointment to the pattern of the primitive Church. Protestantism further rejects the idea of the sacraments as objective healing and saving forces, to be administered by the Church, conveying some kind of assurance of salvation and saving influence different from that of the word of the Bible received by faith. It rejects tradition, which covered the special Catholic Church-institutions with its authority, and holds only to the Bible, which alone is an absolute revelation and alone possesses saving and healing power. But it holds firmly to the idea of the Church as the supernatural

organ of salvation, while interpreting it purely from the Bible. The Bible contains authoritative doctrine; it carries with it the powers of conversion and salvation. It is the instrument and the source of the cultus. The professional knowledge of it is the basis of .'the sacred office. The Bible takes the place of the hierarchy and of the miraculous sacrament; and the two, or three, chief sacraments which are retained are only particular ways of confirming one's confidence in the Bible word-though Lutheranism in the interests of the objectivity of the Church laid stress on the presence of special supernatural factors in the sacraments to which, however, in point of fact, no other influence was ascribed than that belonging to the Bible word. And, indeed, Calvin's sacramental doctrine draws as near as was possible, in view of the doctrine of predestination and the general spirituality of all saving ordinances, to this objective conception of the sacraments.

In these circumstances, the modern problem

of the relation of Church and State simply did not as yet exist. Protestantism did not see in them two distinct organizations, any more than did Catholicism; it only saw in them two distant functions in a body which is indivisibly one and the same, the Corpus Christianum. The applicability of religious standards to the whole body, the exclusion or, at least, disfranchisement of unbelievers and heretics, the principle of intolerance and infallibility, are for it also self-evident necessities. Luther, indeed, at first had confidence that the miraculous power of the spirit and the word would prevail alone and of themselves, but he was not able to maintain this faith against the pressure of events. Thus it was only the relation of the two functions which was readjusted. The supremacy of the hierarchy over the secular government was no longer recognised, nor was a theoretic uniformity and unity of Organisation among the different national Churches required. It is rather that both secular and civil power are alike subject to the

Bible. The civil authority serves the Church from Christian brotherly love, regulates and protects its position for the honour of God, while, in the strength of their knowledge of the word of God, the holders of the spiritual office instruct the civil authority regarding the demands of the Bible. A voluntary harmonious co-operation of the two functions of the Corpus Christianum, and of the bearers of these functions, is the ideal. Moreover, it is in virtue of a Divine commission that the civil authority undertakes the administration of the Lex Naturae, of secular and civil order, and in this also it discharges a religious duty, since this Lex Naturae is, after all, only a part of the perfect Lex Naturae which is summed up in the Decalogue and was recapitulated by Christ. In virtue of this harmonious cooperation, the spiritual authority extends its sway over the whole range of life, including matters of a completely secular character which are ordered by the civil authority, with the assistance of the divines, according

to the spirit and prescription of the Divine word. In all those essential matters which follow immediately from the Divine revelation, uniformity is indispensable. Only in the adiaphora,' i.e. matters not regulated by the word of God, may differences exist, though it should be said that the two Confessions held very different views as to the extent of the adiaphora. Only so far as they were adiaphora could each Confession tolerate the differences of the national Churches which it included. Things, on the other hand, which seemed to be immediately ordained by God---among the Lutherans especially sacrament and dogma; among the Calvinists also Church discipline and the eldership---must everywhere be alike or be made alike.

All this, therefore, certainly implies, as it was previously implied in Catholicism, a Church-directed civilisation; indeed here, where there was no distinction of higher and lower planes of Christian morals, it is still more strictly

applied. The idea is that of a theocracy or, more exactly, of a "Bibliocracy." No doubt the form through which the theocratic government is exercised is now quite different. It is no longer a hierarchy issuing its commands to the civil authority, but a "Bibliocracy " realised by the harmonious combination of spiritual and secular authorities. In this root-idea the two Confessions are entirely at one. In its application they no doubt diverge significantly and with important consequences. Lutheranism thinks, more emotionally and idealistically, of a purely inward and spiritual working of the Divine word. It dispenses with any special, detailed, independent Church-order of its own, intended to secure the practical application of the word of God, and with all guarantees in- tended to oblige the civil authority to follow it. Its aim is simply to place the pure word of God on the candlestick, and it needs, in respect of office, only a provision for the pure preaching of the word and the administration of the sacraments. In the realisation of this aim.

indeed, it does not recoil from the application of force; but everything else it leaves to the automatic working of the spirit which shines forth from the word. And if the secular authority refuses to submit to the word, then, submissive to the will of God, it patiently endures the cruel assaults of Satan, who is only too eager to tempt secular officials and politicians to covetousness and arrogance, or to indifference. This idealism was a marked personal characteristic of Luther, and, taking its rise from him, continued to be influential throughout the whole orthodox period, but it is also, no doubt, connected with Luther's conservative respect for authority, and with the whole of the absolutist development in the German Territories.' In contradistinction to

this, Calvinism is much more active and aggressive, but also much more systematic and politic. It organised itself in a newly-formed republic, the very existence of which was based on Calvinism, and its spirit is dominated by the extremely systematic and rational character of Calvin, the pupil of jurists and humanists, who had never been a monk like Luther.

For all his inclusion of the Church in the general Corpus Christianum, and deliberate subordination, in civil matters, of the spiritual to the civil authority, he shaped a Biblical Church-order, in accordance with the demands of revelation, which made the Church more independent of the fostering Christian love of the civil authority. He supplemented this, moreover, with a moral discipline which, in organised co-operation with the civil authority, worked out in minute detail the application of the Christian ethical standards, and in certain

circumstances imposed them by force. In a case where the properly constituted authority failed to do its part, the duty devolved upon the magistrates inferieurs, that is to say, the official members of the community who came next in rank, to compel the erring authority to uphold the Christian standards. Calvinism, which in doctrine is more spiritualistic than Lutheranism, was in practice less spiritualistic and idealistic, and organised itself for conflict with much worldly wisdom-deriving, however, all its dispositions from the Bible; though it must be said that for these needs it often found more appropriate counsel in the Old Testament than in the New. Thus it possessed sufficient inner strength, during the transition to the modem world and the break-up of the Corpus Christianum, to maintain the position of the Church, and first provisionally, and then definitively, to pass over into a free Church. Whereas, Lutheranism first fell under the sway of an unspiritual Territorialism, and was

subsequently obliged to let itself be erected by the modern State into a Church with an elaborately complicated legal position, hovering between dependence and independence. In all this the Catholic idea of a super- naturally directed civilisation is continued. And still another characteristic of this civilisation survives, viz. asceticism. No doubt it is usual to account it a special merit of Protestantism that it made an end of asceticism and restored secular life to an honourable status. But it is only necessary to remember that Protestantism retained in the strictest fashion the determination of life by the antithesis of heaven and hell, that by abolishing the half- way house and postponing interval of purgatory, it made them only more impressive than before, that its central question regarding the assurance of salvation is expressly concerned with eternal deliverance from original sin. We have only, further, to note that Protestantism even accentuated the Augustinian dogmas of absolute original sin and the complete natural

corruption of all man's powers---and we shall have to admit that the inevitable implications of the ascetic idea have here not disappeared but only changed their form and direction. And that is, indeed, the fact. The change is here, as in the case of the other alterations introduced by Protestantism, a vast one, pregnant with consequences, but for all that, there remains an element which---at least in this form---is foreign to the world of to-day, an element which Protestantism has in common with medieval is "other-worldly" religion.

Protestantism did away with the two different planes of Christian morality, by means of which the old Church had effected a compromise between the demands of secular morality and the Early-Christian ethic, with its indifference towards this world and direction towards the other. And it abolished monasticism and the monastising of the clergy. But it did not do this because it had recognised secular goods and values as ends in themselves in any sense whatever, but because

it saw in separation from the world an unallowable, because self-chosen and external, simplification of duty. It regards the world and its conditions as fixed at the Creation, and as being the natural sphere and presupposition of Christian action. From these natural pre- suppositions a man must not artificially withdraw himself, and by self-created special conditions make his task apparently more difficult but really easier. For these only encourage the delusion of "merit " and human co-operation with grace, and evade the real difficulty of the duty of possessing the world as though one possessed it not. There is certainly in this a stronger instinctive valuation of the created order than Catholicism possessed, with its idea of the supernal world and supernal nature as supposedly more valuable higher stages of existence, a deeper interconnexion of the natural order and the order of redemption than Catholicism could have, with its separation of the two and its placing of them on different planes. Indeed, one

might say that behind this lies a different instinctive conception of the idea of God, in which nature and grace do not appear as different rays of the Divine of differing brightness, but as essentially, inherently, one. And to this the difference between the Catholic and Protestant doctrines of the original condition of things bears witness. But it applies only to the original condition. To the condition of universal corruption introduced by the Fall it is no longer applicable. Since the Fall, everything-physical world, lower creation, humanity-lies in the night of helplessness and misery. A valuation of the present world for the sake of the riches and beauty of the world, an estimation of the goods attained in the progress of civilisation because of an independent ethical value attaching to them, is consequently impossible. But precisely such a valuation of these things is the characteristic feature of the modern feeling towards. the world and civilisation. The myth of the Fall

and the curse upon the world has practically ceased to have any influence in it. And although, of course, even here a yearning for something beyond the world and civilisation makes itself keenly felt, yet the relation to nature and to the historical development of civilisation has come to be conceived in a quite different way, as one can see clearly in the ripe philosophy of Goethe's old age. But the Reformers' recognition of the world and its civilisation is something quite different from this. The world is for them never any- thing but the God-ordained sphere of our action, which we accept as we have to accept conditions of wind and weather. We have to adapt ourselves submissively thereto, and not endeavour to get away from it, but we must never set our affections on it, and never care for it for its own sake. It is in no sense, however limited, anything Divine, but a product of God's will into which the Divine being does not itself enter. Only for God's sake and from obedience are we to desire to

have to do with it. Pain and suffering are the essence of the world, and in death and disease, misfortune and helplessness, we are constantly reminded of the curse of sin. We are to live in it and overcome it through itself, placing all our good and blessedness only in our justification and the death of Christ in our stead; we must never put our trust in the world, and must always be pre- pared for the punishment of sin, submitting ourselves humbly to the world and its course. Humility, obedience, trust in God, these constitute our attitude towards the world, which we accept with all its pain as the, punishment of our sin, and as ordained by God, while its scanty joys are but a transient afterglow of the original goodness of the creation.

In modern literature generally, which has a particularly strong sense of the contrast in this respect, it has become customary to describe as ascetic, an ethic and outlook on the world which rest on the sharp antithesis of the

here and the hereafter and consequently treat the present reality as an earthly vale of tears. But originally the term "asceticism" signified only a possible, but by no means necessary, consequence of this view of things: systematic practice in the renunciation and overcoming of the world. In the wider of these senses the Reformation Gospel is also ascetic, in spite of its admission of secular motives-such motives were not, indeed, wanting in Catholicism. This is not less asceticism because it does not take the form of monasticism, because it renounces the world inwardly and from inward motives and does not outwardly abandon it. In contrast with Catholic asceticism, which expressed itself in a life outside of and apart from the world, this may be described as "intra-mundane" asceticism, and

we only need to realise to ourselves the mental atmosphere of the Renaissance, or the glorification of the world in modern poetry, or, again, as the sphere of modern technical achievements, in order to feel that even this "intra-mundane" asceticism is a real asceticism. The fact is that asceticism must necessarily follow from the premises of the whole

system of redemption; and a supernatural redemption from a corrupted and God- abandoned natural condition of things is also the fundamental idea of Protestantism.

So far both Confessions are at one, but in the working out of the principle they differ from one another in very important ways. The Lutheran asceticism, like other parts of the system, draws its support from Luther's idealistic spirit. It is left, without rule or compulsion, without plan or law, to the conscience of the individual. It is not rationalised and disciplined, but remains a free energy, a tone and temper of mind, and that is why in individual cases it recognises so many things as adiaphora. Thus it remains more free and inward. On the other hand, it also remains, in accordance with the reluctance of Lutheranism to take an active part in the world and its confidence in the automatic working of the Spirit, mainly a mere endurance and toleration of the world, which does not exclude, indeed, on occasion a thankful and obedient joy, but is

nevertheless essentially a self-abnegation and submission, a transference of all hope to the blessed world of the hereafter, and a rejoicing in martyrdom in this world. This is asceticism in the wider modern sense of the word, as indicating a metaphysical attitude towards life; which, however, in a fashion characteristic of Lutheranism-and very sympathetic to human nature generally-alternates, on no principle at all, with a hearty acceptance of the good gifts of God.

Quite different is the Reformed asceticism. It is, like Calvinism as a whole, active and aggressive, desires to re-shape the world to the glory of God, and make the reprobate' bow submissively to the -Divine law, and will with all diligence create and maintain a Christian commonwealth. To this end it rationalises and disciplines, in its ethical theory and Church-disciplinary instruction, the whole of action. It restricts more and more closely the range of the things left by Calvin as adiaphora for the uses of recreation, anathem-

atises as creature-worship every tendency to value earthly things as ends in themselves, but nevertheless demands the systematic use of all possibilities of action which are capable of contributing to the progress and well-being of the Christian commonwealth. It scorns all mere emotion and sentiment as idle and frivolous, but is inspired by a profound sense of working for the honour of God and his Church. Thus there arises, in addition to an unresting activity and strict severity, a systematic completeness and a Christian-social trend in the spirit of Calvinistic ethics. This is asceticism more in the older technical sense of the word, as a systematic disciplining of the natural man for the attainment of a goal of life which lies in the hereafter, hanging many points of contact with Jesuit asceticism, as has often been pointed out. Lutheranism endures the world in suffering, pain, and martyrdom, Calvinism masters it for the honour of God by untiring work, for the sake of the self- discipline which work. supplies, and the well-

being of the Christian community which may be attained by means of it. But, at bottom, both merely applied in different ways the asceticism inseparable from the full belief in redemption. The Lutheran avoids "naturalism" and reliance on natural forces and impulses. The Calvinist avoids the "creature-worship" which is involved in every form of love of the world for its own sake. Both adapt themselves to the wholly and immediately Divine and "other-worldly " end to which this world looks, but the one does so passively, the other actively.

If all these considerations be taken into account, it becomes obvious that Protestantism cannot be supposed to have directly paved the way for the modern world. On the contrary, it appears at first, in spite of all its great new ideas, as a revival and reinforcement of the ideal of authoritatively imposed Church civilisation, as a complete reaction to medieval thinking, which sweeps away such beginnings of a free and secular civilisation as had already

been toilsomely established. Goethe compared it to the French Revolution---"it turned back the advance of quiet culture." And, in addition, it supplied the incentive to a revival of the Catholic idea, and so, in spite of the con- temporary diffusion of the ideas and manners of the Renaissance, Europe had to experience two centuries more of the medieval spirit. It is true that anyone who approaches the subject from the side of political or economic history, will not receive this impression, since in these departments the movements which began in the late Middle Ages continued to develop without a break, and, indeed, to a large extent took Protestantism into their service. But anyone who approaches it from the side of the history of religion, of social ethics or of science, will not be able to escape the impression that it was only the great struggle for freedom at the end of the seventeenth and in the eighteenth century which really brought the Middle Ages to an end.

But this only makes it a more pressing

question how, in spite of all that, Protestantism could play a conspicuous part in the production of the modern word. As to the fact of its influence there can be no question. The paradox is explained if we follow the hint which this statement of the problem gives us," and seek its influence at first not in a universal regeneration or reconstruction of life as a whole, but mainly in indirect and unconsciously produced effects, nay, even in accidental side-influences, or again in influences produced against its will, particularly if we take into account, alongside of Protestantism proper, the effects of the humanistic criticism which was bound up with it, the ideal of the Baptist sectaries, and the mystical subjectivism. In this way it will the more clearly appear just where the point is at which a really direct and immediate connexion exists. I shall endeavour briefly to sketch these effects in the different departments of

civilisation, intentionally splitting them up under these different categories. It is only by resigning the attempt to construe every- thing on the basis of a single leading idea which ex hypothesis itself produces and shapes everything, and by taking account of the multitude of different parallel and independent- indeed, sometimes contradictory-influences, that we can arrive at an understanding of the real causal connexion. The influence of accident, that is, the combination of several independent causal series, should never be underestimated in such matters. To allow for it is not to abolish or deny the existence of the great main line of direct development of ideas, but only to protect it from confusions and disturbances. If such a development be present at all, this cautious procedure will only serve to emphasise it.